We develop a multi-tasking model in which a firm can devote its efforts either to increasing sales growth, or to improving per-unit profit margins by, e.g., cutting costs. If the firm's manager is concerned with the current stock price, she will tend to favor the growth strategy at those times when the stock market is paying more attention to performance on the growth dimension. Conversely, it can be rational for the stock market to weight observed growth measures more heavily when it is known that the firm is following a growth strategy. This two-way feedback between firms' business strategies and the market's pricing rule can lead to purely intrinsic fluctuations in sales and output, creating excess volatility in these real variables even in the absence of any external source of shocks.
Introduction
In his company's annual report for 2001, Amazon.com founder and CEO Je¤rey Bezos begins his letter to shareholders as follows: "In July of last year, Amazon.com reached an important way station. After four years of single-minded focus on growth, and then just under two years spent almost exclusively on lowering costs, we reached a point where we could a¤ord to balance growth and cost improvement, dedicating resources and sta¤ed projects to both."
As this statement suggests, many …rms face a fundamental strategic tradeo¤: they can focus their e¤orts on increasing sales growth, or on improving pro…t margins (e.g., by lowering unit costs), but given limits on managerial time and other resources, doing more on one dimension necessarily implies doing less on the other. In other words, the choice of whether to emphasize growth or margins is essentially a multi-tasking problem of the sort envisioned by, e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) .
In this paper, we study the implications of this multi-tasking problem for the dynamics of …rm behavior. We are particularly interested in the interplay between …rms' strategies and the way that the stock market goes about evaluating them. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, just as a …rm can change its strategic orientation over time, so too can investors shift the emphasis that they place on various performance measures. In the speci…c case of Amazon.com, Hong and Stein (2004) provide a detailed reading of equity analysts'reports, and document that, during the period that Bezos calls the growth phase (roughly through the end of 1999), analysts were almost uniformly focused on growthrelated metrics in valuing Amazon stock, to the virtual exclusion of pro…tability or cost-related metrics. 1 Conversely, during the cost-cutting phase that followed, analysts began to pay much more attention to per-unit measures of costs and pro…ts. 2 One interpretation of the Amazon story is that managers actively cater to the stock market's preferences in choosing their strategies. That is, when the market is more interested in growth than pro…t margins, managers like Bezos give the market what it wants, by focusing their e¤orts on delivering increased revenue growth. And when the market changes to being more interested in margins, managers take the cue and adapt their strategies accordingly. Certainly, if one thinks of the market's valuation model as exogenously given, it would seem to make sense for a manager interested in maximizing her …rm's current stock price to cater in this fashion.
Alternatively, one might read the Amazon story as saying that …rms'strategies drive the market's valuation model, not the other way around. And again, it would seem perfectly rational for investors to pay more attention to a …rm's growth numbers if they know that management is devoting most of its e¤ort to generating growth. 3 We take the view that the causality runs in both directions. In our model, managers interested in their stock prices do indeed cater to the market, but at the same time, the market's valuation model rationally takes into consideration what it perceives to be a …rm's current business strategy. This two-way feedback can produce a variety of interesting e¤ects. Perhaps most notably, it can lead to autonomous ‡uctuations in output growth, even absent any external source of shocks.
The …rst step in understanding how these ‡uctuations arise is to note that in a static setting, the two-way feedback can generate multiple equilibria when parameter values are in an "intermediate" range such that neither a growthoriented nor a margins-oriented strategy represents too extreme a deviation from …rst-best e¢ ciency. For example, if the market conjectures that the …rm is pursuing a growth strategy, its valuation will tend to put more weight on realized growth, which will in turn encourage the manager to stick with the growth strategy, so long as this is not too ine¢ cient. On the other hand, if the market conjectures that the …rm is pursuing a cost-cutting strategy, its valuation will tend to emphasize margins, which will reward the manager for staying with the cost-cutting strategy. Now consider the dynamics. Imagine a …rm that starts out endowed with such attractive growth prospects that, irrespective of the market's conjecture, the optimal choice is for it to pursue a growth strategy. This puts us initially in the growth equilibrium, in which the market price is especially sensitive to performance on the growth dimension. Now over time, as it penetrates the market more fully, the …rm will begin to …nd the growth strategy less attractive. More speci…cally, it will eventually reach a point where, if it were only interested in choosing the …rst-best action, it would start shifting resources away from the growth strategy, and toward the margins strategy. But here is where things get di¢ cult. For as long as the market continues to value it as a growth …rm, any change in strategy will lead it to disappoint the market on the growth dimension, thereby damaging its stock price. Thus if it cares about pleasing the market, the …rm will be trapped into continuing with the growth strategy longer than is optimal, instead of attending to cost-cutting, as it should.
Eventually, the market will become so saturated, and the growth strategy so ine¢ cient, that the …rm will have no choice but to switch to a margins strategy. However, relative to the …rst-best, this shift will not only come too late, it will be too abrupt. Much like Bezos' description of Amazon post-1999, the …rm will go to the other extreme of focusing exclusively on cost-cutting, as opposed to taking a balanced approach of devoting some resources to each of the two strategies. This lack of balance in turn sets the stage for another round of ‡uctuations. Once entrenched in the margins equilibrium, with the market now expecting strong performance on the margins dimension, the …rm will for too long pay insu¢ cient attention to growth opportunities, and will eventually get to a point where it is forced to go back to the growth strategy, at which point the whole process begins again. The bottom line is that unlike in the …rst best-where the …rm responds to a smooth decline in its growth prospects by gradually and monotonically shifting resources away from a growth strategy and towards a margins strategyadjustment in a world where managers cater to the market involves a series of sharp oscillations. The …rm may go from an all-growth strategy, to an allmargins strategy, then back again to an all-growth strategy, before eventually settling down. Central to this result is the premise that managers care to some degree about maximizing their current stock price, as opposed to just the present value of future cash ‡ows. Indeed, the more intensely a manager cares about the current stock price, the more dramatic are the associated ‡uctuations.
The idea that the stock market can lead to excessive volatility in investment and output is a venerable one, going back at least to Keynes (1936) . More recent treatments of this idea have tended to emphasize the role of irrational noise traders, who create exogenous deviations of stock prices from fundamentals. The question then typically asked is to what extent these mispricings in ‡uence corporate investment, either at the micro or macro level. 4 Our approach in this paper is quite di¤erent. In most of our analysis, we model the market as fully rational, albeit imperfectly informed about managerial ability. 5 Moreover, beyond this uncertainty about ability, we introduce no further exogenous sources of variation-i.e., there is no analog in our setting to noise-traderinduced sentiment shocks. Thus the real-side volatility in our model is driven by intrinsic forces, and changes over time in the market's approach to valuation are completely endogenized. As we argue in detail below, this leads to a novel set of empirical implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a static version of our model. This static version leaves a lot out; in particular, it takes the demand for a …rm's products to be exogenous. However, it helps to develop the basic intuition for how multiple equilibria can arise in our setting. In Section 3, we study dynamics. In so doing, we endogenize the demand curve facing the …rm at any point in time, via a market saturation mechanism of the sort alluded to above-i.e., when the …rm plays the growth strategy for several periods in a row, this reduces the stock of unsatiated cus-tomers and hence shrinks demand going forward. In Section 4, we ‡esh out the model's most distinctive empirical implications. Section 5 discusses related work, and Section 6 concludes.
Static Model

Technology and information structure
To build intuition and lay the groundwork for our dynamic model, we begin with a very simple static setup. We consider a …rm that produces for two periods. In the …rst period, the …rm's manager must decide how to allocate her e¤ort between two business strategies: (i) a "growth"strategy of expanding production and sales; and (ii) a "margins" strategy of maintaining sales while improving pro…t margins (say by reducing unit costs). Following Holmstrom (1999) , we assume that the manager's ability is initially unknown to both the manager herself and the market. However, it is inferred by the market at the end of the …rst period, based on the …rm's performance at this time. Managerial ability is captured by a parameter a which is normally distributed with mean A and variance v a :
The …rm's …rst-period pro…t is the sum of two components, a sales-volume component s 0 and a margins component m 0:
6 Thus:
where s 0 and m 0 depend on both managerial ability, as well as on the manager's allocation of e¤ort. The manager is endowed with one unit of e¤ort, a fraction e of which is devoted to the growth strategy of increasing s 0 and the remaining (1 e) of which is devoted to improving margins m 0 . The manager chooses e¤ort so as to maximize her expected utility U; which we take to be equal to a linear combination of current pro…ts and the …rm's stock price: 7
where the stock price P 0 is equivalent to the market's discounted expectation of future (i.e., second-period) pro…ts as of the end of the …rst period. As will become clear shortly, this expectation will depend in part on the market's updated assessment of managerial ability. We assume the following technologies for generating …rst-period sales and margins respectively:
and
where: (i) q 0 denotes the size of the market, which for the time being we take to be exogenously …xed (an assumption we will relax in the next section when we analyze the dynamics of the model); (ii) " s is a random variable which captures sales shocks, and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance v s ; and (iii) " m is a random variable which captures margins shocks, is normally distributed with mean zero and variance v m , and is independent of " s . The technologies for sales and margins embody two key assumptions. First, ability and e¤ort are complements when it comes to improving either aspect of performance. As emphasized by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) , this implies that one learns more about an agent's ability by looking at her performance on the dimension on which she is working the hardest. 8 Second, there is an asymmetry across the two tasks: both managerial e¤ort and ability have a higher marginal product in terms of increasing sales when the size of the market q 0 is larger, but their impact on margins is independent of market size. This means that, insofar as the manager is interested in maximizing current pro…ts, she will be more inclined to devote her e¤orts to the growth strategy when q 0 increases.
In the second period, we assume that the …rm's pro…ts are given by:
where 2 (0; 1) measures the persistence of the sales and margin shocks over time. Thus not only do the sales and margins shocks partially carry over from one period to the next, but the …rm is also better o¤ in the second period, all else equal, with a higher-ability manager. The timing of actions within the …rst period is as follows. First, the manager chooses an allocation of e¤ort. Second, sales and margins are realized and publicly observed. Third, the market updates its forecast of second-period pro…ts, based on the observed values of sales and margins, and its prior conjecture as to how the manager allocates e¤ort. This in turn determines the …rst-period stock price P 0 . Recall that the stock price is simply the discounted expectation of second-period pro…ts, which implies that:
where e is the allocation of managerial e¤ort that the market conjectures, and is the market's discount factor between the …rst and second periods.
First best
The natural benchmark is the case in which the manager has no incentive to distort her e¤ort allocation in order to impress the market. This case arises when either the manager's ability a is public information ex ante (i.e., when v a = 0), or when the manager does not care about the stock price (i.e., when = 0). If either of these conditions holds, the manager will simply choose e so as to maximize expected …rst-period pro…ts: max e fE( 0 ) = aeq 0 + a(1 e)g:
It then immediately follows that the static …rst-best is to set e = 1 (i.e., to pursue a growth strategy) if q 0 > 1 and to set e = 0 (i.e., to pursue a margins strategy) if q 0 < 1. Again, the intuition for this result is that the marginal return on e¤ort devoted to the growth strategy is greater when the size of the market q 0 is larger.
The interaction between the …rm and the market
To solve the model in the more general case in which the manager does try to in ‡uence the market's perceptions, we proceed as follows. We begin by endowing the market with a particular conjecture about managerial actions (e.g., the market might conjecture that the manager is pursuing a growth strategy). Given this conjecture, we can solve for market prices as a function of the …rm's observed performance on the growth and margins dimensions. Then we take the manager's perspective and ask what strategy she will prefer to follow, in light of the market pricing rule. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the manager's optimal strategy coincides with the market's conjecture. In other words, an equilibrium is a pair (e; e ) such that: (i) anticipating the market conjecture e ; the manager chooses an e¤ort allocation e; and (ii) e con…rms the market conjecture, namely: e = e :
Stock prices
Suppose …rst that the market conjectures that the …rm is pursuing a growth strategy (e = 1). Then, based on the observed realizations of s 0 and m 0 ; Bayesian updating leads to the following pricing rule for the …rm's stock:
where, using the fact that the two variables s 0 and m 0 are uncorrelated, we have that:
and mg = cov ( 1 ; m 0 je = 1) =var (m 0 je = 1) = :
Similarly, suppose that the market conjectures that the …rm is pursuing a margins strategy (e = 0). Then, based on the observed realizations of s 0 and m 0 ; Bayesian updating leads to the following pricing rule:
A couple of features of these pricing rules should be emphasized. First, we have that mm > sm . In other words, when the market thinks the manager is playing the margins strategy, it puts more weight on margins than on sales. This makes intuitive sense: when the manager is actively trying to improve margins, the realization of m 0 is more informative about her ability, and hence about future pro…ts, than is the realization of s 0 . Second, if q 0 < 1; (which will always be satis…ed in a neighborhood around q 0 = 1, given that < 1), then sg > mg , which means that when the market thinks the manager is playing the growth strategy, it puts more weight on sales than on margins. These inequalities suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria, in which the manager may cater to the market's beliefs. For example, if the market believes that the manager is playing a margins strategy, the pricing rule will tend to reward strong performance on the margins dimension more, which will, all else equal, make the margins strategy more attractive to the manager.
The potential for multiple equilibria
We are now ready to construct the equilibria of the game between the manager and the market. This involves postulating a market conjecture, e 2 f0; 1g; then, using the updating rules derived above, computing the expected payo¤ to the manager under alternative e¤ort allocations; and from there deriving the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which e = e is indeed the optimal strategy for the …rm manager.
Suppose …rst that the market conjectures that the manager is following the growth strategy e = 1. Then, if the manager chooses to be consistent with the market conjecture by in fact pursuing the growth strategy (e = 1), her expected sales, pro…ts and margins are respectively equal to:
Therefore, from our analysis in the previous subsection, her expectation of the resulting stock price is equal to:
Thus by choosing a growth strategy in the face of a growth conjecture, the manager obtains a total utility payo¤ equal to:
Now, if the manager instead chooses to go against the market conjecture by focusing on margins (e = 0), her expected margins, pro…ts and sales are equal to:
and her expectation of the resulting stock price is equal to:
Thus, by choosing a margins strategy in the face of a growth conjecture, the manager obtains a total utility payo¤ equal to:
Comparing equations (16) and (19), we see that by deviating away from the market conjecture, the manager generates sales that are below expectations by an average amount Aq 0 ; and margins that are above expectations by an average amount A; the former translates into a loss in reputation and hence in the stock price, while the latter translates into a gain. Overall, the manager will choose to ful…ll the market's conjecture by choosing e = 1 whenever:
Thus for su¢ ciently large market capacity q 0 , it will always be an equilibrium for the manager to play the growth strategy. Denote by q the value of q 0 that satis…es the above constraint with equality. Using the expressions for sg and mg derived above, one can analyze how the cut-o¤ point q varies with the parameters of the model. In particular, note that q solves:
Using this fact, one can show that q is a decreasing function of both abilityuncertainty, a , and the intensity of the manager's concern for the stock price, . If either of these parameters goes to zero, it is easy to see that q goes to one. That is, we converge to the …rst-best situation, where the growth strategy is only played if q 0 1:
Applying similar reasoning, we can derive the conditions under which the margins strategy is an equilibrium. Suppose the market conjectures that the manager is playing a margins strategy. Then the expected utility to the manager from going along with the market and playing the margins strategy is equal to:
On the other hand, if the manager deviates from the market conjecture and chooses a growth strategy, her expected utility is equal to:
By deviating from the market's conjecture, the manager reduces margins below expectations by an average amount A, whereas she raises sales above expectations by an average amount Aq 0 : The manager will choose to conform with the market's expectation and emphasize margins whenever
Denote by q + the value of q 0 for which condition (24) holds with equality. Or equivalently call q + the solution to:
Once again, it is straightforward to show that q + is an increasing function of both a and : Moreover, we have:
when a and are both strictly positive, whereas
in the …rst best case where at least one of a and is equal to zero. Our analysis of the static model is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that and a are both strictly positive. Then, there exist two cut-o¤ values q and q + such that:
the unique equilibrium is that the …rm plays the margins strategy (e = 0); (iii) if q 0 > q + , the unique equilibrium is that the …rm plays the growth strategy (e = 1); (iv) if0 q + , there are two equilibria, one where the …rm plays margins and the other where the …rm plays growth. The size of this multipleequilibrium region increases with or a ; but it vanishes as or a converge to zero, in which case the …rm always plays the …rst-best strategy.
Again, the economic intuition behind the proposition is one of managers catering to the stock market's beliefs. If the market perceives that a …rm is trying hard to generate sales growth, it will tend to react more strongly to news about growth, because such news is more informative about managerial ability. In contrast, if the market thinks that the …rm is focusing its e¤orts on improving margins, it will tend to react more strongly to news about pro…tability. In either case, a manager who is concerned about stock prices will tend to give the market what it is looking for, which creates the scope for multiple equilibria. And the more intense the manager's concern with stock prices, the wider the range of parameters under which multiple equilibria arise.
Dynamics
In the static analysis, we took the market size q 0 to be exogenously …xed. Now we consider the case where q varies endogenously over time, in response to …rms' past strategic choices. In particular, we assume that the longer a …rm pursues a growth strategy, the more it exhausts the potential pool of customers for its products, and hence the lower is demand going forward. This formulation yields a system with its own internal dynamics, and allows us to ask, e.g., how the volatility of sales growth depends on the various parameters of the model.
The evolution of demand
Imagine an in…nite-horizon economy in which, at each date t, q t denotes the per-…rm unful…lled demand for a durable good which is produced by many identical …rms. This demand comes from a unit mass of consumers with un…lled orders. Every period, a fraction of these consumers die, and are replaced by new consumers with individual orders of Q t : These births and deaths lead to di¤erent dynamic equations for q t depending upon whether …rm managers choose a growth versus a margins strategy. More speci…cally, the dynamics of un…lled orders q t can be described as follows.
In the growth regime, there are per-…rm sales of Aq t , leaving un…lled orders of (1 A) q t at the end of period t: 9 Before the next period, a fraction of consumers with un…lled orders die, so the carryover into period t + 1 is (1 ) (1 A) q t . In addition, a fraction of new consumers are born, with orders of Q t . So if the growth regime prevails at time t, we have:
In the margins regime, everything is the same, except that per-…rm sales at time t are 0. So if the margins regime prevails at time t, we have:
More generally, if managers choose to allocate an interior level of e¤ort e t to the growth strategy-so that we are in neither the pure growth nor the pure margins regime-we have:
These equations fully characterize the evolution of demand from one period to the next. Again, the key point to note is that if we are in the growth regime at time t, this leads to lower demand at time t + 1, since the representative …rm produces more and hence satis…es a greater fraction of the un…lled orders.
Information structure
With respect to incentives and information structure, we try to stick as closely as possible to the assumptions of the static model. Firms are run by a succession of one-period managers. The manager who is in charge at time t has ability a t , and a utility function given by:
Here t denotes time-t pro…ts, and P t is the time-t market value of the …rm. That is:
where, again, denotes the market's discount factor from one period to the next. By analogy to the static model, we assume that the ability of the timet manager a¤ects both current and future pro…ts, which in turn implies that it also matters for the …rm's time-t stock market value P t : This assumption corresponds to the reasonable idea that a better manager leaves a …rm in better shape when she departs, all else equal-i.e., the bene…ts of her tenure show up in pro…ts even after she is gone. In particular, pro…ts are given by: create s a t = a t e t q t + " s t , and m a t = a t (1 e t ) + " m t , and use these two variables to predict next period's pro…ts.
The timing of events can be described as follows. First, at the beginning of every period t; the new manager chooses how to allocate her e¤ort; this, together with past managerial ability and the realization of current and past shocks, determines the level of current pro…ts, sales, and margins. Second, based on observed sales and margins, and its own prior conjecture as to the strategy that the …rm is following, the market generates a forecast of next period's pro…ts, which in turn in ‡uences the stock price P t . Third, starting from a given amount q t of un…lled orders at the beginning of period t; …rms' strategic choices determine the level of un…lled orders q t+1 at the beginning of the subsequent period t + 1. And …nally, at the beginning of period t + 1, past shocks and past managerial abilities become public information, and the whole cycle begins again.
We shall focus attention on dynamic self-ful…lling equilibria which are de…ned as sequences of un…lled orders q t , market conjectures e t , and managerial e¤ort allocations e t ; such that, for all t: (i) given (q t ; e t ) it is optimal for managers to choose e¤ort allocation e t ; (ii) the allocation e t coincides with the market conjecture e t ; and (iii) q t+1 satis…es the general version of the transition equation (30).
First best
Before proceeding, we consider the …rst-best benchmark in two cases. In the …rst of these, the demand ‡ow Q t remains constant over time. In the second, Q t declines monotonically.
A market with constant demand ‡ow
Suppose that the demand ‡ow Q t is simply equal to a constant Q at all times, and that either or a are equal to zero, so that managers do not care about the market. Now, we know from our analysis of the static model that when or a are equal to zero, managers will be indi¤erent between the growth and margins strategies at date t if and only if q t = 1. In the dynamic case, the question is whether we can sustain a steady-state equilibrium in which q t = 1 for all t, and in which managers devote a …xed interior level of e¤ort e f 2 (0; 1) to growth.
If the manager's e¤ort allocation is indeed e f , equation (30) tells us that the dynamics of q t are given by:
This implies a unique steady-state value of q t ; namely
Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the interior amount of e¤ort to be chosen in all periods is that q s be equal to one. This in turn allows us to solve for the …rst-best e¤ort allocation e f ; namely:
It follows that in the …rst-best case where managers do not care about impressing the market, a steady-state equilibrium-in which growth-related e¤ort is given by e f every period, and q t 1-always exists as long as the parameters ; Q; and A are such that the right-hand side of (39) lies strictly between zero and one. Note also that this equilibrium is stable in the sense that starting from q t > 1, managers will choose the growth strategy so that q t will decrease towards 1: And similarly, starting from q t < 1; managers will choose the margins strategy which will make q t increase towards 1. In contrast, we will show below that when managers do cater to the market, it is in general not possible to sustain a stable steady-state equilibrium of this sort.
If the parameters are such that the right-hand side of (39) does not lie between zero and one, we have a corner solution. In particular, if the righthand side of (39) exceeds one, this means that the demand ‡ow is so great that even under the pure growth strategy, the …rm cannot keep up with demand, and un…lled orders asymptote to q t = Q= ( + (1 )A) > 1. Similarly, if Q < 1, so that the right-hand size of (39) is negative, the …rm plays the pure margins strategy, and un…lled orders asymptote to Q.
A market with shrinking demand ‡ow
It is straightforward to extend the above reasoning to the case where Q t declines monotonically. Consider the natural analog to (39) with a time-varying e¤ort e f t :
If we start out with a value of Q t such that the right-hand side of (40) exceeds one, the …rm is initially at a corner solution, and plays the all-growth strategy in which e f t = 1. Over time, as Q t falls, the right-hand side of (40) drops below one, at which point we have an interior solution with the level of e¤ort devoted to growth, e f t , given by (40). From this point on, the equation tells us that further declines in Q t lead to matching declines in e f t . Eventually, when Q t drops below one, we hit the other corner, where e f t = 0, and the …rm plays the all-margins strategy. The important point here is that if demand shrinks monotonically, so must the e¤ort devoted to the growth strategy. As we will demonstrate below, this need no longer be the case when managers care about stock prices.
Excess volatility when managers cater to the market
We now reintroduce a managerial concern with stock prices, and show that this can lead to endogenous volatility in sales growth. Our reasoning proceeds in two steps. First, we consider a given period t and show that Proposition 1 continues to hold. That is, for the same cut-o¤ values q and q + as in the static case: (i) the unique equilibrium is that …rms choose the growth strategy whenever q t > q + ; (ii) the unique equilibrium is that …rms choose the margins strategy whenever q t < q ; (iii) for q < q t < q + ; the two equilibria coexist.
Second, we consider the dynamics of q t and the resulting managerial decisions over time. To do so, we assume that in a dynamic equilibrium the market maintains the same conjecture as in the previous period whenever there continues to exist a static equilibrium with that conjecture. Thus, for example, if q t enters the multiple-equilibrium region (q ; q + ) from above-that is, coming from the region q t > q + where the growth strategy is the unique static equilibrium-then as long as q t remains in that region, the …rm and the market keep playing the growth equilibrium. Or said di¤erently, whenever there is a choice of equilibria, we select the one played in the prior period.
Within-period analysis
To understand why the same cut-o¤ values q and q + obtain as in the static model, observe that a …rm's market value as of the end of period t can be expressed as:
where t+1 is a function that depends on only those random variables that are realized from t + 1 onwards. Thus as of period t, the market makes a conjecture e t about the …rm's current choice of strategy, and tries to forecast exactly the same item as in the static model, namely (a t + (" s t + " m t )); period-t observations of pro…ts, sales and margins are of no help in forecasting t+1 . 11 Moreover, given our previous assumptions on information structure, the market has access to the same two predictive variables as before, s a t = a t e t q t + " s t , and m a t = a t (1 e t ) + " m t . So the inference problem is completely unchanged. Similarly, from the perspective of the period-t manager, everything is also the same, since her utility function is the same as in the static model. Thus Proposition 1 continues to apply as stated, with the only modi…cation being that q 0 is replaced everywhere with q t .
Equilibrium selection in the dynamic model
In order to fully pin down the dynamic evolution of q t and e t , we need to specify a mechanism for picking an equilibrium when we are in the parameter region (q ; q + ) where there are multiple static equilibria. To do so, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A1: If at date t; for a given value of q t ; there exist (according to Proposition 1) multiple static equilibria, the same equilibrium is chosen as in the previous period.
As noted above, this assumption can be thought of as introducing an element of history-dependence into the equilibrium-selection criterion. 12 Importantly, the assumption does not require any departure from Bayesian rationality on the part of either the market or managers. Rather, it follows from imposing some relatively mild non-common-knowledge structure on the market's higherorder beliefs out of equilibrium. In particular, Assumption A1 would be implied by the following higher-order beliefs. Suppose that the market believes that managers believe that the market is inertial in its conjectures-in other words, the market believes that managers believe that the market always maintains the same conjecture about managers'strategies as in the prior period. And suppose further that managers understand that the market has such beliefs about them. This will lead both sides to coordinate on the equilibrium-selection criterion we have assumed. Moreover, neither side's beliefs will ever be contradicted along the path of play. 13 
Deterministic cycles with constant demand ‡ow
With all the pieces now in place, let us return to the case where the demand ‡ow Q t is equal to a constant Q. We can now state our central result:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption A1, with Q t constant, and with and a both positive, we have that: (i) there no longer exists a stable stationary equilibrium in which managers allocate a positive and time-invariant amount of e¤ ort to both growth and margins, except for possibly on a zero-measure subset of parameters; (ii) there exists a subset of parameters with positive measure, for which one can construct a cyclical equilibrium. In this cyclical equilibrium, the …rm switches back and forth between the growth and margins regimes at regular intervals, and the level of un…lled orders q t ‡uctuates within a range bounded by two extreme values q > q + and q < q :
Proof: Part (i) of Proposition 2 is proven in the appendix. Here, we just establish part (ii); this part of the proof is briefer and captures most of the important intuition. Let q g and q m denote the …xed points of the dynamic equations (28) and (29), i.e., the steady-state values of q t in the all-growth and all-margins regimes, respectively. We have already noted that:
and: q m = Q:
Then, a su¢ cient condition for the existence of endogenous cycles is simply that:
To see why, suppose that at some date t; un…lled orders q t lie in the interval (q g ; q ): Then, the unique static equilibrium is for managers to play the margins strategy. But then Assumption A1 implies that the market will maintain the margins conjecture, and managers will continue to ful…ll that conjecture, until q t crosses the threshold q + . This crossing will necessarily occur in …nite time, since q m > q + : When the threshold is crossed, the margins strategy will cease to be an equilibrium and the …rm will switch to the growth strategy. Once the growth strategy is in place, q t will begin to decline, heading towards q g . Now, since q g < q , the sequence q t will cross the threshold q in …nite time, which in turn brings us back to the situation where we started-i.e., where q t belongs to the interval (q g ; q ) and where the margins strategy is the unique equilibrium.
This establishes part (ii) of the proposition. It also should be pointed out that, since q and q + are independent of Q and A; the above condition (44) is easily satis…ed if is small relative to A and Q, because in this case, q g is approximately equal to Q=A, which can be made arbitrarily small, while q m = Q, which can independently be made large. Figure 1 provides an illustration of deterministic cycles with constant demand ‡ow. We choose the following baseline parameter values: Q = 2, = 0:1, A = 0:5, a = s = m = 1, = 0:1, and = 1. We then solve the model forward over 100 periods, for each of three values of : (i) = 0 (i.e., the …rstbest case); (ii) = 1:0 ; and (iii) = 1:5. In each case, we plot the evolution of q t over time.
In the …rst-best case, q t starts out at a value of 0:2, so we are initially in the margins regime. The low level of output associated with the margins strategy causes q t to rise. When q t hits one, the …rm switches to an interior level of e¤ort given by (39). From this point onward, the …rm is in steady state, with e f = 0:22, and q t …xed at one.
Moving to the catering-to-the-market case when = 1:0, we have that q = 0:71, and q + = 1:41. Thus the …rm stays with the margins strategyand q t keeps increasing-for longer than in the …rst-best, until q t crosses 1:41. At this point, the …rm switches to the growth strategy, which drives q t sharply downward. When q t falls below 0:71, the …rm goes back to the margins strategy, and the cycle starts over again.
Things are qualitatively similar with = 1:5. However, we now have that q = 0:64, and q + = 1:59, i.e., the size of the multiple-equilibrium range has increased. This leads to more pronounced overshooting, and hence to a smaller number of cycles, with each cycle being of larger amplitude. Consider in particular the …rst switch point. With = 1:5, the …rm stays with the margins strategy longer, until q t crosses 1:59. Thus the …rst transition to the growth strategy is delayed, coming at t = 14, rather than at t = 11, as in the case where = 1:0. The bottom line is that the increase in results in q t being on average further away from the …rst-best value of one. The natural interpretation is that a more intense managerial focus on current stock prices has negative consequences for economic e¢ ciency.
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Non-monotonic adjustment with shrinking demand ‡ow
The other case of interest is the one where the demand ‡ow declines monotonically over time. As seen above, in the …rst-best this decline in demand ‡ow is matched by a monotonic reduction in the e¤ort devoted to the growth strategy. The goal here is to show that when managers cater to the stock market, the adjustment of growth-related e¤ort-and hence of q t -can be non-monotonic.
The mechanism is very similar to that which generates cycles in the constant-Q case. For the sake of concreteness, suppose that the demand ‡ow Q t declines geometrically over time, that is:
with 0 < < 1: Moreover, let Q 0 be large, so that the …rm starts out in the growth regime. In this regime, the dynamics of q t are given by:
According to (46), q t will eventually start declining. Moreover, by Assumption A1, the …rm will stay in the growth regime past the point where q t drops below one, until q t passes through q . (Recall, by contrast, that in the …rstbest, the …rm transitions to an interior level of e¤ort as soon as q t reaches one.) Once q has been breached, the …rm will switch to the margins regime, where the dynamics of of q t are given by:
Because the e¤ort devoted to growth has been cut by a discrete amount, it is possible that q t will now start rising, in spite of the general downward drag from the shrinking demand ‡ow. Indeed, q t may well cross back above q + , leading the …rm to switch back to the growth regime once again.
Of course, in the long run, q t will always converge to zero (since the demand ‡ow Q t is going to zero), and the …rm will wind up absorbed in the margins regime. But what is interesting relative to the …rst-best case is that this convergence need not be monotonic. Indeed, it can in principle involve a number of transitions back and forth between the growth and margin regimes, with corresponding ‡uctuations in the value of q t . Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon of non-monotonic convergence. We set Q 0 = 20, = 0:9, = 0:1, A = 0:5, a = s = m = 1, = 0:1, and = 1. We then plot the evolution of q t in two cases: (i) the …rst-best case where = 0; and (ii) = 1:0.
In the …rst-best case, q t starts out at a value of 2:0, so we are initially in the growth regime. In spite of this fact, the demand ‡ow is so high in the early periods that q t continues to increase, reaching a peak value of 3:2 at t = 3. From this point on, the level of output associated with the growth strategy is enough to overwhelm the now-smaller demand ‡ow, so q t begins to fall. When q t hits one, which happens at t = 14, the …rm switches to an interior level of e¤ort given by (40). This e¤ort level declines gradually over time, and q t remains …xed at one, until t = 30. From this point onward, the demand ‡ow is too low for an interior e¤ort level to be viable. Therefore the …rm moves to the pure margins strategy, and q t declines toward zero.
In the second-best case, with = 1:0, we have as before that q = 0:71, and q + = 1:41. Everything works the same as in the …rst-best case during the early periods-the …rm plays the growth strategy, and q t …rst rises, then begins to fall. However, the two cases diverge when q t reaches one. Rather than moving to an interior e¤ort level, the …rm stays with the growth strategy for longer, until q t drops below 0:71, which happens when t = 18. At this point, the …rm switches to the margins strategy. Demand ‡ow is still strong enough that this switch leads q t to begin increasing. When q t rises above 1:41, the …rm goes back to the growth strategy, and q t starts falling again. As it turns out, this second growth episode is the last one; the next time that the …rm returns to the margins strategy, demand ‡ow has abated to the point where q t never again reaches q + . Thus overall, the …rm starts with growth, switches to margins, goes back to growth, all before settling permanently into the margins strategy.
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Behavioral variations
Investors use simple models
So far we have taken stock-market investors to be fully rational-i.e., able to form Bayesian forecasts based on all observed variables. In what follows, we brie ‡y explore the consequences of a simple form of bounded rationality. In particular, we suppose that there is a representative investor who can only run univariate regressions. 14 Since optimal forecasting in our setting requires the use of bivariate regressions, this is a meaningful limitation. In all other respects, however, the representative investor is completely rational. His univariate forecasts are unbiased, and in any given equilibrium (growth or margins) he picks the single variable that minimizes the variance of forecast errors.
In principle, the single most powerful forecasting variable for next period's pro…ts can be either: i) current pro…ts; ii) current sales; or iii) current margins, depending on the equilibrium that we are in. So to solve the general case, we would have to compute the forecast errors associated with each of these three variables, across both the growth and margins regimes. To keep things simple, we focus on an extreme but illustrative case, where the persistence coe¢ cient is small but non-zero. We …rst revisit the static model, and then sketch the dynamic implications.
In the context of the static model, it is easy to see that when is positive but small, the best predictor of 1 in the growth regime is s 0 , and the best predictor of 1 in the margins regime is m 0 . Moreover, since s 0 and m 0 are uncorrelated, the optimal univariate regression coe¢ cients sg and mm are exactly the same as given before. All that changes is that mg and sm are now e¤ectively set to zero, as opposed to their previous values of in the fully rational case. In other words, in the growth regime the representative investor focuses only on sales, and gives it the same weight as before, while completely ignoring margins, with the reverse being true in the margins regime.
As in Section 2, we can calculate cut-o¤ values of q 0 that de…ne the regions over which the growth and margins equilibria can exist. Denoting these revised cuto¤s by q b and that q + b , we have that q b solves:
This equation is almost identical to its counterpart (21) in the rational case, except that the term ( ) on the left-hand side of that equation has now disappeared. It follows immediately that:
Similarly, q + b satis…es:
This equation also looks like its counterpart (25) in the rational case, except for the term ( q) which has disappeared from the left hand side. This in turn yields:
Thus for the static model, introducing the bounded-rationality feature enlarges the multiple-equilibrium region, from (q ; q + ) to (q b ; q + b ). There is a very natural intuition for this result. Suppose we are currently in a growth equilibrium. With bounded rationality, the market pays attention to sales as before, but now completely ignores margins. Thus for a manager who contemplates deviating from the growth strategy to the margins strategy, the prospective hit to her stock price is more severe than before-the market will penalize her for the reduction in sales, but will give her no credit whatsoever for the improvement in margins. As a result, she is more inclined to simply continue playing the growth strategy. Similarly, if we start o¤ in a margins equilibrium, the manager will again be very reluctant to deviate to a growth strategy.
Notice that introducing bounded rationality has an e¤ect that is isomorphic to increasing the parameter , which measures how intensely managers care about the current stock price. In the former case, the potential for multiple equilibria goes up because there is a bigger stock-price penalty for bucking the expectations of a naive market; in the latter case, the potential for multiple equilibria goes up because managers are less willing to tolerate a stock-price penalty of any given size.
When we move to the dynamic setting, everything continues to work exactly as before, except that we now use the new cut-o¤ values q b and q + b in place of their rational counterparts q and q + . This implies that whenever the conditions of Proposition 2 are satis…ed, and a cyclical equilibrium exists, the magnitude of the ‡uctuations is greater than before, in much the same way as an increase in leads to more extreme ‡uctuations. Again, this is because once entrenched in a given regime, managers are more reluctant than before to change strategies. As a result, they play any given strategy longer, which leads to more pronounced overshooting of q t . Figure 3 illustrates the contrast between the rational and bounded-rationality cases. We return to a constant-demand- ‡ow environment, and set Q = 2, = 0:1, A = 0:5, a = s = m = 1, = 0:1, = 1, and = 1. We then trace out the evolution of q t for both cases. The plot corresponding to the fully-rational case is actually identical to the one for = 1 in Figure 1 ; all the other parameter values are the same, and so we again have q = 0:71, and q + = 1:41. With bounded rationality, q b = 0:65 , and q + b = 1:55; these are almost the same cuto¤s that we obtained under full rationality in Figure 1 by setting = 1:5. So not surprisingly, we get essentially the same outcome: cycles are of both longer duration and greater amplitude, and on average, q t is farther away from the …rst-best value of one.
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Investors treat stocks in the same category similarly
Another potentially interesting extension of our model-which we do not pursue formally here- ‡ows from the observation of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) that investors tend to place stocks into broad categories, and to think about stocks within a given category in a similar way (see also Mullainathan (2002) ). In our context, this might mean using the same pricing rule (based on either a growth conjecture or a margins conjecture) to value all …rms in a category at a given point in time. For example, it might be that during the dot-com boom, investors lumped all internet retailers into a category, and used the same growth-oriented pricing rule to value all of them.
In such an environment, the behavior of any one …rm can have interesting spillovers onto other …rms in the same category. If Amazon.com initially has very strong growth prospects, and winds up entrenched in the growth equilibrium, this might force other internet retailers into pursuing a growth strategy as well, because they know they will be evaluated by the market based on the pricing rule from the growth equilibrium.
Empirical Implications
We now turn to the model's empirical content. First, we discuss the implications that ‡ow from the version with fully rational investors. Next, we brie ‡y touch on the extra predictions that arise when bounded rationality is added to the mix.
The model with rational investors
Unlike most of the literature on the stock market and real activity, our theory's primary focus is not on how the level of stock prices in ‡uences real variables. That is, we have little to say regarding the textbook Q-theoretic prediction that a …rm's investment and sales growth will be higher when its stock price is high (Tobin (1969) ). Instead, what matters in our framework is the market's pricing rule-i.e., the sensitivity of stock prices to observable variables such as sales and pro…t margins. Thus our central implication is that a …rm's investment and sales growth will be higher when its stock price is more sensitive to growthoriented metrics. And conversely, a …rm's investment and sales growth will be lower-and pro…t margins higher-when its stock price is more sensitive to measures of costs and margins. Moreover, a subsidiary prediction is that these basic e¤ects will be more pronounced in those …rms where managers have highpowered incentives to maximize short-term stock prices.
How might one operationalize tests of these hypotheses? Although a complete treatment of this question is beyond the scope of the paper, we can o¤er a few tentative thoughts. First, one might use cross-sectional regressions to estimate the sensitivity of stock prices to di¤erent variables at a given point in time. To be more speci…c, imagine that for industry i at time t, we take all the existing …rms, and run a cross-sectional regression of each …rm's market-tobook ratio against: (i) some measure of its growth-related performance (e.g., sales growth over the prior year); and (ii) some measure of its per-unit profitability (e.g., its gross margin). The coe¢ cient on the former variable would then be the "growth beta" for industry i at time t, and the coe¢ cient on the latter variable would be the "margins beta".
The next step would be to relate changes in these growth and margins betas over time to changes in the nature of …rm performance. In particular, one could ask whether, e.g., investment is on average higher for …rms in industry i at those times when the industry's growth beta is larger. And with the appropriate data on managerial incentives, one could further check to see if this relationship is more pronounced in the subset of …rms where managers have a lot of stock or options that can be sold in the near future.
We are unaware of any empirical work that explores these questions. However, we should mention a pair of recent papers by Wurgler (2004a, 2004b ) that share a similar spirit. Baker and Wurgler develop a catering theory of dividends, and provide the following evidence in favor of it. First, they calculate at any point in time a "dividend premium", de…ned as the di¤erence in the average market-to-book ratio of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying …rms. They then show that variation over time in this dividend premium helps to explain …rms'choices of dividend policy: …rms are signi…cantly more likely to initiate dividend payments when the dividend premium is high. While Baker and Wurgler's interest is in a …nancial, rather than real variable (i.e., dividends, as opposed to sales growth or investment), the structure of their tests is closely analogous to what we propose above. That is, they estimate the point-in-time sensitivity of stock prices to a particular …rm attribute using cross-sectional comparisons, and then show that managers'apparent willingness to deliver this attribute is greater when the market values it more highly. 15 
Consequences of bounded rationality
The fully-rational version of the model has nothing to say about expected stock returns-they are simply constant over time. In contrast, the boundedrationality version of the model makes a novel and relatively subtle prediction. When we are in a growth equilibrium, the market fully impounds all growthrelated information, but ignores margins-related information. This implies that in a growth equilibrium, …rms with strong pro…t margins will be undervalued, and have high expected returns, while …rms with weak pro…t margins will be overvalued, and have low expected returns. Conversely, in a margins equilibrium, the market takes account of margins-related information, but underweights growth-related information. So …rms with strong growth performance will have high expected returns, and …rms with weak growth performance will have low expected returns.
The key insight is that neither attribute-growth or margins-will be systematically mispriced at all times. Rather, there will be time-variation in the nature of cross-sectional return predictability. For example, sometimes a trading strategy of buying high-margin …rms and shorting low-margin ones will work well, and at other times it will work less well. Moreover, the theory tell us precisely when the strategy should be expected to work best: when the industry in question is in a high-growth regime.
Again, we do not know of any work that can be thought of as a systematic test of this hypothesis. Perhaps the closest bit of evidence comes from Baker and Wurgler (2004c) . They too are interested in the general idea of timevariation in the cross-section of expected stock returns, and they examine how the predictive content of di¤erent …rm characteristics for stock returns varies with proxies for the overall level of investor sentiment. One of their …ndings is that: (i) when investor sentiment is relatively high, unpro…table …rms have lower expected returns than pro…table …rms; but (ii) when investor sentiment is relatively low, this pattern reverses itself, so that unpro…table …rms have higher expected returns. If one thinks of investor sentiment as being positively correlated with economy-wide growth prospects, this …nding can be seen as …tting nicely with the predictions of our theory.
Related Work
Our model relates to several distinct branches of literature. One of these, which we discussed brie ‡y in the Introduction, considers the impact of investor sentiment and stock-market mispricing on corporate investment. As noted above, our model di¤ers from this work in that we do not require any irrationality on the part of investors to generate our principal results (though the model can, as we have argued, accommodate such irrationality). Moreover, in our setting, variation in the market's pricing rule is endogenous-there is no analog to exogenous, noise-trader-induced sentiment shocks.
Another prominent theme in corporate …nance has to do with the consequences of managerial "short-termism". Work in this area (Narayanan (1985) , Stein (1989) , Bebchuk and Stole (1993) ) has tended to emphasize a relatively static set of ine¢ ciencies that arise when, in a world of asymmetric information, managers are concerned with maximizing current stock prices instead of long-run value. For example, if the stock market focuses exclusively on reported earnings, short-term-oriented managers will take various steps to pump up earnings, either via accounting manipulations, or through real-side distortions such as cuts in maintenance expenditures, changes in pricing policies designed to bring forward current sales at the expense of future sales, and so forth.
By contrast with this work, our premise is that the market makes inferences about …rm value based on multiple variables (i.e., both growth and pro…tability measures) rather than just earnings. This leads to the potential for a broader set of outcomes than in models of earnings hyping; for example, …rms may sometimes invest too much, when they are playing the growth strategy. And importantly, multivariate learning generates a more dynamic account of …rm behavior, whereby the nature of the distortion varies over time along with the market's approach to valuation.
The one paper in the short-termism/learning genre that is closest to ours is Rajan's (1994) account of bank credit cycles. Like we do, Rajan considers the possibility that there will be time-variation in how the market makes inferences about managerial ability. In particular, if a bank reports poor performance due to loan losses, it will tend to be evaluated harshly by the market, unless many other banks are also su¤ering loan losses at the same time, in which case the market will blame a systematic shock. This mechanism can lead to cycles in which banks roll over bad loans for several periods in order hide their losses, and then, when the buildup of bad loans reaches a critical point, they coordinate and all switch to a strategy of loss recognition and credit contraction. This is similar in many ways to our story. Perhaps the most noteworthy di¤erence is that in Rajan's model, the dynamics of learning are driven by a benchmarking externality across banks. That is, there need to be several similar banks, and the market must base its evaluation of bank i in part on the performance of bank j. In our model, on the other hand, each …rm is evaluated by the market based solely on its own performance.
Within the large literature on macroeconomic ‡uctuations, we are probably closest to the work on endogenous business cycles. 16 This research shows that purely intrinsic cycles can arise from a variety of other sources beyond those considered here: (i) the existence of non-linearities as in Grandmont (1985) ; (ii) price or wage rigidities which lead to a multiplier-accelerator mechanism as in Goodwin (1951) ; or (iii) pecuniary externalities combined with credit constraints, as in Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999). Also related is Shleifer (1986) , who shows that endogenous cycles can be driven by each …rm's desire to coordinate the timing of its investments with that of other …rms. As with Rajan (1994) , Shleifer's model is thus fundamentally about strategic interaction across …rms, whereas ours is about the interplay between a single …rm and the stock market. 17 
Conclusions
The basic message of this paper can be simply stated. A desire on the part of managers to please the stock market can introduce signi…cant excess volatility 1 6 The work on endogenous business cycles can be contrasted with the real-business cycle (RBC) approach pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1982) , as well as with models based on "sunspots" or "animal spirits" (e.g., Woodford (1990) , Howitt and McAfee (1992) ). In the RBC framework, ‡uctuations result from exogeneous shocks to, e.g., demand or technology. In sunspot models, extrinsic variables also play a key role, namely that of coordinating agents' expectations. 1 7 Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) embed Shleifer's (1986) implementation cycles into a full- ‡edged Schumpeterian framework in which both R&D activities and implementation decisions are endogenous. This means that, as in our model, …rms have to divide their e¤orts between two tasks-in their case, R&D and production.
into real variables such as output and sales, even if the market itself is fully e¢ cient. This conclusion di¤ers from the premise implicit in much recent research in behavioral …nance-that the stock market can only exert a destabilizing in ‡uence on real activity to the extent that it is subject to non-fundamental sentiment shocks. Our theory makes a number of distinctive empirical predictions, which we hope to explore in future empirical work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2, Part (i): Suppose, hypothetically, that there exists a stationary equilibrium in which managers devote the same interior level of e¤ort e h to the growth strategy in all periods. In this case, the steady-state value of q t is given by:
In order for managers to be willing to allocate an interior level of e¤ort, it must be that they do not gain by deviating to either the all-growth or the all-margins strategies. Using arguments similar to those in Section 2 above, this condition can be shown to imply:
where mh and sh are the regression coe¢ cients that the market uses to forecast future pro…ts based on observed margins and sales respectively, given a conjectured e¤ort allocation equal to the hypothesized value of e h . Intuitively, the larger is mh relative to sh , the more weight the market puts on margins relative to sales in the hypothesized equilibrium, and hence the larger must be the size of the market q h to deter managers from deviating to the all-margins strategy.
The regression coe¢ cients mh and sh are both functions of e h . In particular, we have that: 
Using these expressions for mh and sh , it can be shown that (53) implies the restriction that q < q h < q + . In other words, to support an interior level of e¤ort, q h must lie inside the range where the static model admits multiple equilibria.
If there is to be a stationary equilibrium, (52) and (53) must both be satis…ed, which gives us two equations in terms of the two unknowns, q h and e h , as well as various other parameters of the model. However, even if there is a solution to these two equations with an interior value of e h , the resulting stationary equilibrium will not in general be stable.
To see why, suppose that we perturb q t slightly away from q h . At this point, there can no longer be a static equilibrium with interior e¤ort. Suppose that the all-growth equilibrium is chosen instead. Then by Assumption A1, we know that the growth equilibrium will be maintained as long as q t remains above q . This in turn implies that q t will decline over time until either: i) it hits q ; or ii) it asymptotes to q g . Given that q < q h , the only way for q t to converge back to the equilibrium value of q h is if:
Thus for the hypothesized stationary equilibrium to not only exist, but be stable, we require that (52), (53), and (56) all hold. This is an overdetermined system-there are three equations, and only two unknowns, q h and e h . As a result, a stable stationary equilibrium can only occur on a zero-measure subset of the parameter space. This establishes part (i) of the proposition. As an aside, note that this stability problem does not arise when = 0. In this case q = q h = 1, which means that after a perturbation away from the stationary state to the growth equilibrium, we are eventually pushed back to exactly the point where the interior-e¤ort stationary equilibrium is viable. The parameter values are chosen as follows: 2, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 0.1 and 1. We then plot the evolution of for three cases (i) 0,( ) 1.0,( ) 1.5. 0  4  8  12  16  20  24  28  32  36  40  44  48  52  56  60  64  68  72  76  80  84  88  92  96 The parameter values are chosen as follows: 20, 0.9, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 0.1 and 1. We then plot the evolution of for two cases (i) 0,( ) 1.0. The parameter values are chosen as follows: 2, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 0.1 and 1. We then plot the evolution of for two cases (i) the case where the investors are fully rational, and ( ) the 
